Estado Novo: The Opening Movement in the Requiem for Brazil

This article was written by guest author Christian Phillips. He is a third-year International Relations and Social Anthropology student at the University of St. Andrews.

There can be little doubt that the political situation in the First Brazilian Republic had become untenable by 1930. Perhaps its inception through an unpopular coup against Emperor Pedro II in 1889 had ensured its existence would always be unsustainable and marred by illegitimacy. Perhaps it was an opportunity to further the creed of liberal democracy that was lost to the decay of small-minded ambition and the stained hands of laughing oligarchs. Either way, the federal constitution adopted in 1891 granted significant autonomy to regional states but lacked a system to develop their status or regulate the inequality between the economic centre of São Paulo and the outlying Northern regions.

Whilst the office of Emperor had been abolished, the extensive monarchical elite remained unaltered and the process to determine presidential succession was quickly entrusted to patronage and the domination of the law by wealth. An agreement was reached between the two most powerful states, São Paulo and Minas Gerais, to retain the traditional focus of power and alternate executive control between them. Economic favours were granted to the legislature in exchange for personal loyalty and electoral support. Through this process, the fundamental values of leadership and the vitality of the country were being gradually eroded away. Compounding this was the sudden dismantling of large moderating institutions in the wake of Pedro II’s removal, such as the Chamber of Deputies and Council of State. Whilst replacements would eventually be drafted, these were hollow and depended on regional systems, making them easy to manipulate if state elites were able to influence their locale. As such, the vast majority of political power was concentrated in the coffee fields and farms of the countryside rather than the halls and chambers of government offices. Because of the military sympathies held by the coup’s ringleaders, the power vacuum left the army disjointed and bloated but uniquely powerful. This created the necessary circumstances for an unhealthy and inefficient organisational structure in the Republic that gradually seeped into public life and corrupted the wellbeing of society. The major stakeholders in Brazilian politics were aware that they did not have the necessary appeal to win a public election. Therefore, many political freedoms were curtailed and the ongoing monopolization of coffee and milk production in the South was encouraged in order to devolve power to predictable landowners instead of the reluctant public.

By limiting the risks to their position, they unintentionally created the exact conditions that would contribute to their downfall. Public anger against a lack of government transparency and the economic downturn of the Great Depression fuelled the image of the First Republic as an inept facade. Despite attempts to present the coup as the successor to the ideals of the French Revolution, they were unable and unwilling to prove the similarities without also damaging the stability of their leadership. This was a strategy intended as a tool to limit public agitation that eventually backfired into creating a heightened sense of uncertainty over the political future of Brazil when the government reneged on its egalitarian promises. By 1930, the Republic found itself caged by the very expectations it had set for itself. The monolithic influence of Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais had resulted in a homogenous and decrepit economy. Mirroring this, the military had trod the velvet road of decadence, led by people who sought to extoll the virtues of conflict and violence from safety and subsist on the flattery of mass hysteria.

Naturally, there were vast numbers of the people who recognised that their society had lost the ability to renew itself. Industrial and demographic change had resulted in the formation of a middle-class who opposed the political stagnation that had become increasingly evident. However, whilst the sentiment behind this movement was warranted, their enmity was directed towards the powerful oligarchs alone, rather than the system that had granted them supremacy. At length, this aspiration for improvement would be replaced by a preference for irresponsibility and the neglect of political freedoms in exchange for a quick solution to their problems. This ‘quick solution’ manifested as a dictatorship, with the zeal of nationalist fervour being an adequate distraction to the stagnancy of the era. Although this regime would succeed in centralising power and preside over a period of industrialisation and national stability, this economic focus would ultimately only provide greater tools for corrupt officials to reassert themselves in the long-term. As the republic festered, the medication that had been demanded for decades was administered with the 1930 Brazilian Revolution. A lawyer, Getúlio Vargas, received his part in the theatrical production of politics and stepped onto the stage amid upheaval. Under his leadership, the Old Republic and its foundations were dissolved entirely. Instead, the New State was chosen as the necessary relief to remedy the economic and social ills of the country, at the expense of long-term sustainability. As his supporters were distracted by the light of potential, the rot of corruption remained in Brazilian society and would reemerge empowered and result in most of the ills afflicting the country today.

Although the Revolution would eventually result in an authoritarian regime, an early attempt at a coalition government was evident until 1934. The broad public support that accompanied the Revolution of 1930 may have enabled Vargas to seize power, but it also forced him to frequently alter his political stance and compromise to maintain the balance across his power base. As such, the Northern sugar barons were integrated into his movement with the selection of João Pessoa of Paraíba as Vice President in order to accommodate the financial requirements of his reforms. Already, this points to the main flaw that would permanently stalk the admittedly impressive industrial progress of the New State: That the existence of political patronage and corruption was sustained through the replacement of the most powerful oligarchs with their weaker rivals. The supremacy of Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais would be undermined by the Northeast for a time, but the roots of the original structural problem that had granted them power remained embedded in Brazil’s state-level economies. This was an act to embrace the very same kind of people who had cast off the responsibility of governance and supervised the decline of the nation to secure their own wealth. Whilst it could be partly excused as a necessary evil, to place the survival of the movement above the ideals that founded it, this would ultimately curse the New State into repeating the mistakes of its predecessor.

After this decision, Vargas would subsequently move to suppress the crusading ‘tenentes’, the young military officers who formed the backbone of the coup’s actual strength. Although removing the more radical elements of his support base had brought more stability to the nascent government, the remaining moderates largely only supported the coup as a personal vendetta against the Southern elite. Once they had seemingly been removed, the general neglect that followed allowed others to simply take their place and continue the system of patronage. From this, the main indictment of the New State comes into focus: Through attempting to secure Brazil’s economic influence, the necessary political changes to achieve this sustainably were discarded, paving the way for corruption to solidify control over social and national processes after the New State shared the same fate as the Old Republic in 1945. The old wealth inequality would reemerge, Sao Paulo would remain the hub of Brazil’s economic activity and wealth concentration. The national mechanisms of the New State and the new corporations established during this period, such as Petrobras, would simply provide more tools for the wealthy to extend their influence. Whether due to a lack of experience or deliberate ignorance, Vargas would inadvertently recreate the extreme wealth inequality of the Old Republic and fundamentally did not alter the trajectory that society was heading.

This was evident through the reliance on state interventionism to expand Brazil’s domestic industrial power whilst also preserving the agrarian domains held by the oligarchs in his camp. Since 85% of the workforce remained employed in agriculture, this group would come to advocate for greater independence and land reform. As these calls were increasingly ignored, they began to feel increasingly marginalised and resorted to violence in an attempt to draw attention to the difficulties they faced. However, this approach was largely self-defeating. With all executive decisions centralised in the South, it made it easier for these incidents to be regarded as a loss of order that should be quelled rather than a political movement. The issue of economic balance had turned into an issue of public safety and attempts to reform land ownership were abandoned. Through attempting to placate the weaker oligarchs in North Brazil, Vargas moved to suppress aspects of his support base who had hoped for an overhaul of the underdeveloped regions in Bahia and Maranhao. As this issue would never be addressed, the resulting economic growth disparity between the North and South would remain until today, retained and cemented into being as a consequence of the policies Vargas pursued. The state would come to establish a partly-owned national industrial base and self-sufficient economic model that matched the ‘autarkies’ of fascist European countries. Unity through industry and national pride rather than through a coherent political structure was the aim of the new power. Whilst the consolidation of the loose alliance is visible with the creation of the Social Democrat Party, this was more of a vehicle for representation and lacked a core that could function without Vargas himself. Indeed, even before the transformation of Brazil into a total dictatorship by 1937, Vargas was very clearly the centre of the new political effort. As his term limit was nearing its expiration it seemed as though he would end up as another failed experiment, with many of his goals left unfinished or distorted into false successes.

By this point Vargas was politically unassailable and barely restricted by legislature, planting the idea that perhaps the constitution was a limiter rather than a guide for the policies he could implement. At this juncture the Cohen Plan was enacted as the means to guarantee the continuity of the new regime. It sought to use the fear of a communist uprising and the increasingly unstable international order to stir up fear in the populace, arguing that Congress was stifling his attempts to protect national security. Congress, for its part, lacked the power to oppose him or to even prove itself as an ally to his cause, adding to the outrage. On this tide of suspicion, Vargas was able to permanently dissolve Congress and repeal the Constitution, establishing a new order that granted him authoritarian control. A National Security Tribunal was granted the power to imprison political dissidents without trial and the police force operated under a system of martial law. Unfortunately, the police now faced the same morality trap as the army had 40 years ago. The speed of the transition into wielding significant influence inflamed its leadership and it was unable to enforce discipline or validate the crimes of those they incarcerated. The impacts of this are still visible today with the extent of corruption within the police and their frequent connection to politics. The autonomy of regional states was reduced further and the consolidation of power was swift after total judicial and executive power was transferred to the office of the President. Brazil at this point found itself in a unique political situation. The New State was for all intents and purposes a totalitarian regime, banning political parties and free speech. However, it did not become yet another regime to succumb to fascism. The Fascist Integralist Party under Plinio Salgado would also find itself targeted by security forces and rejected by the New State. Interestingly, Vargas would also recognize the difficulties faced by indigenous communities. Numerous projects were undertaken to assist the provision of medical supplies and jobs to communities in the Amazon, to the extent that Vargas would be termed the “Father of the Poor”. Perhaps he did genuinely seek the betterment of his country and was simply forced into a difficult position with no choice but to play the part of a dictator. Or potentially the New State was always an attempt to gain absolute power regardless of ideals, parasitically using nationalism for support and collective anger as his weapon. Regardless, good intentions cannot be used to hide failure or ineptitude. The economic improvements made during his tenure were impressive, but this cannot be allowed to overshadow the impact of his political actions or the direction of his economic policies. His coup and privatisation of the police and army reinforced the trend of using military power and populism to achieve regime change, rather than true democratic election or progress. This would be demonstrated through the years of military dictatorship in Brazil from 1964-1985. The continuous usage of force to enact reform would profoundly weaken the electoral system and ensure the relevance of patronage and personal allegiance in determining the outcome of political disputes. Even after the liberalisation of Brazil in the 1990s, the shadows left by the New State remain engraved onto its political processes, guiding Bolsonaro to office on the same populist movement that Vargas had made his own in 1930. Despite all of this, Vargas remains the only dictator in modern history to be reelected into the office in 1951 after being deposed in 1945 through another military coup. If anything this points to the undeniable support his rule enjoyed with the people even after his repressive policies and removal of all democratic institutions. It is doubtful that at this point any true fundamental change can be made to Brazil’s political and economic woes without resurrecting Vargas’ ghost and plunging the country into another spell of unrestrained dictatorial rampancy.

Overall, it remains another conspicuous example in history that raises the issue of how political legacies should be determined. Is it warranted to consider pride as a measure equal to material statistics? This is a question of whether the self-esteem of a country and its people can be compared to stability, economic growth and soft power. Whether a government that grants its people a sense of renewed pride in their identity is beneficial or if this merely feeds into complacency and dangerous notions of superiority. Ultimately, the New State and its modern consequences form another chapter in the eternal debate over whether there is anything more valuable than human life. A discussion between those who believe that there is something greater than ourselves and those who believe in the individual above all else. Personal freedoms against strong government, self-interest against collective benefit and elective responsibilities in life against the obligations that come with being human. In this case, the argument dominating the New State’s political stance was that personal rights must be sacrificed and regulated for the good of the country. A regime that hoped to remove corrupt public officials and strengthen the weak political system that ironically guaranteed they would persist to the present.

This is a period that reveals many of the warranted arguments against despotism. And yet, I feel as though there is one that does not get the attention it deserves. That authoritarianism allows for people to easily place all the sins of a time onto the actions of an individual without acknowledging the complicity of the wider population in allowing it to happen. The vast sea of political mania created when people are eager to subsume their discontent into contrition and violence. The people who claim ignorance when asked about atrocities and distance themselves from an administration that they previously cheered for only out of fear that it might crush them as it collapses. The people who discard their morality for the sake of self-preservation or blankly stare on as their country falls victim to narcissism. These are the people who sweep leaders onto the political stage by action or apathy. Whilst Vargas can certainly be held responsible for policy-making and the impact of that on Brazil, his supporters cannot be excluded from that process. They share in the blame of unleashing political horrors into the world, both the bellowing tyrants and spineless husks clawing for a chance in power regardless of morality. They form the orchestra needed to play the first and last notes for the opening movement in the Requiem for Brazil.